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JenniFer AengSt  PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY
the politiCS oF Fertility: 
populAtion And pronAtAliSm in lAdAKh
In India’s northwestern region of Ladakh, the linkage between reproduction, politics, and fertility 
is both complicated and contested, evident in increasing population discourses and the re-emergence 
of a Buddhist pronatalist movement. This paper examines the impacts of population discourses and 
pronatalism on women’s reproductive decision-making, as well as on the delivery of healthcare throughout 
Ladakh. Population discourses currently circulating produce two reproductive subjects—the “hyper-
fertile Muslim woman” and the “vulnerable Buddhist”—both of which have been central in revitalizing 
Buddhist pronatalism. Data collected through a hospital-based survey and interviews shows that fertility 
behavior is shaped by religious interpretations, political mobilization, and pressure to be culturally loyal. 
Fertility decisions are not simply about one’s reproductive choices and desires—but are instead situated 
in a contested context where Ladakhis are worried about culture loss. While these cultural pressures 
differently impact Muslim and Buddhist women, the growing politicization of reproduction results in 
continued ethnic/religious conflict that has far-ranging impacts throughout the region.
the politiCS oF Fertility/AengSt
A Buddhist woman walks into the maternal 
child health (MCH) ward at Leh’s Sonam Norboo 
Memorial (SNM) hospital with a baby strapped to 
her back, tied in the traditional way: with the baby 
lying flat against the mother’s back and a tight knot 
tied in the front of the mother’s chest. She enters the 
crowded MCH ward hesitantly. A young nurse barks 
at her, “Achay-le [sister], sit here,” pointing to the 
crowded bench in the hall. When it is the woman’s 
turn to give her reproductive health history, she shyly 
bows her head and whispers, “I’m here for the copper 
T.1” When asked how many children she has, she 
says that though she has two children, she has been 
pregnant four times. “Family planning is a sin but 
I like family planning too,” she explains. The next 
patient, a 23-year-old Muslim mother of two, echoes 
this view: “I am using a copper T but people tell me 
that I should remove it…but I have a small baby 
and I want the gap,” she asserts. Family planning 
is controversial in Ladakh. Though Buddhist and 
Muslim women both describe family planning as a 
sin, they also express how grateful they are to space 
their pregnancies. Doctors also have conflicted 
1. Copper T is a type of intrauterine device (IUD) that is 
common in India.
feelings about family planning: “family planning is 
good; you shouldn’t bring (up) an unwanted child,” 
a female surgeon said, “though I’m worried because 
the population growth rate is declining so one day 
the Ladakhi population will be extinct, especially 
the Buddhist population; I’m worried on the whole.” 
Family planning—which was unproblematic 
just over a decade ago—is becoming politicized 
and increasingly linked to ethnic and religious 
conflict. Public support for family planning has 
waned while religious opposition to particular 
contraceptive methods and practices has escalated 
(Smith, 2009a, 2009b). Furthermore, population 
concerns have led to the emergence of a Leh-based 
pronatalist movement that targets Buddhist women, 
encouraging them to “out breed” the Muslims. Yet 
these fertility politics impact Buddhist and Muslim 
women differently; high fertility is encouraged 
for Buddhists but is thought by many Ladakhis to 
indicate the “backwardness” of Muslims. Taken 
together, this indicates the multiple ways that 
reproduction in Ladakh is “stratified,” where 
power relations—especially those in the religious 
and political spheres—are shaping reproductive 
practices and ideologies (Ginsberg and Rapp, 1995). 
In this article, I show how the population discourses 
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circulating throughout Ladakh produce two reproductive 
subjects—the “hyper-fertile Muslim woman” and the 
“vulnerable Buddhist.” These discourses are generating a 
pronatalist movement and are escalating hospital politics, 
both of which impact women’s reproductive decision-
making and the delivery of healthcare throughout Ladakh. 
In this way, reproduction has become a space not only for 
identity politics between groups but also for real politics that 
impact the lives of Ladakhi women. As a result of growing 
reproductive politics, there is a disjuncture between idealized 
subjectivity (cultural pressures regarding fertility behavior) 
and practice (women’s actual fertility practices). This split 
subjectivity—where women and gynecologists both monitor 
their statements and practices regarding fertility and family 
planning—indicates what kind of strategies are needed 
when reproduction becomes so highly politicized.
Based on data compiled during 16 months of research in 
Ladakh between 2006-2011, I show that fertility practices of 
Buddhist and Muslim women do not align with the religious 
and political discourses from their respective communities. 
Research was conducted among women, men, medical staff, 
religious authorities, and political leaders in both urban 
(Leh, Kargil) and rural (Diskit) sites, using four methods: 
interviews, participant observation, a survey, and archival 
research. I conducted semi-structured interviews with a 
diverse pool of women—Buddhist, Muslim, rural, urban, 
married, and unmarried—as well as with men, adolescents, 
medical staff; NGO workers; and religious and political 
leaders. I conducted a hospital-based survey with 237 
women in Ladakh’s largest hospitals (Leh, Kargil, Diskit) 
that generated data on contraceptive use and knowledge; 
fertility rates and preference; delivery history and preference; 
and attitudes towards family planning. Women’s opinions on 
family planning—where most supported it, yet also called 
it a sin—were expressed in semi-structured interviews as 
well as through my hospital survey. Participant observation 
in hospitals allowed me to witness interactions between 
patients and medical staff, as well as deliveries, surgeries, 
gynecological exams, and prenatal check ups. Archival 
research was conducted in order to understand the history of 
ethnic/religious conflict and population trends.
POPULATION GROWTH AND POPULATION 
DISCOURSES
Ladakh is a high-altitude region cut off from the rest 
of India during winter, which exacerbates already-existing 
sentiments of political marginalization.2 Ladakhi Muslims 
complain that Buddhists dominate regional politics, while 
2. Frustrated with the lack of regional representation and cognizant 
of Jammu and Kashmir’s status as the only Muslim majority state, many 
Ladakhis feel doubly marginalized—by both the state and the Indian nation 
(Bhan, 2006). J&K state has special status under the Indian Constitution, 
where Article 370 stipulates that while the Indian Parliament can determine 
issues of defense, communications and Foreign Affairs, all other laws 
require acceptance from the J&K state government.
Buddhists perceive themselves as a minority within a 
Muslim-controlled state government (van Beek, 2004). With 
Ladakhis making up less than 2.3 percent of Jammu and 
Kashmir state’s population, competition among Buddhists 
and Muslims for the few government seats is fierce.3 This is 
reflected regionally, as Leh district has a Buddhist majority 
(77 percent) while Kargil district has a Muslim majority (80 
percent).4 Though this sense of political marginalization is 
both widely shared by Ladakhis and has persisted over time, 
it underlies the current perception of a population crisis.
Those who worry about Ladakh’s future often advocate 
positions that appear contradictory, such as simultaneously 
supporting family planning and pronatalism. Dundup,5 
a young married man in Leh who works for a local non-
governmental organization (NGO), explained the importance 
of children to the Buddhist community: “We should have at 
least four or five children…having two is not enough. Ladakh 
is a very big place and we don’t have the problem of poverty 
like the rest of India… for our generation we did a very wrong 
thing [referring to the Indian government’s National Family 
Planning program], we are killing our generation.” Like many 
Ladakhis, Dundup has a strong pronatalist position, based 
on his perception that the Ladakhi population—specifically 
Ladakh’s Buddhist population—is in decline. This perception 
is fueled by broader Buddhist concerns that Buddhism is 
weakening and under threat, though this relies upon earlier 
histories of Buddhist/Muslim conflict (van Beek, 2001). Yet 
Dundup also advocates family planning, adolescent sexual 
health education, and access to contraception. For Dundup, 
the message of pronatalism (“reproduce more”) and family 
planning (“a small family is a happy family”) do not conflict. 
Neither pronatalism nor family planning are new to 
Ladakh, but what is new is the heightened sense of controversy 
that surrounds them both. While population numbers are 
currently politically charged, fears of a growing Muslim 
population have long existed among Ladakh’s Buddhists 
(Bray, 1991; van Beek, 2004).6 Pronatalist activism does 
more than just encourage women to continue reproducing; it 
also takes a clear position against contraception, specifically 
permanent methods such as ligation (permanent female 
sterilization). Family planning—which was first introduced 
in Ladakh during the early 1980s—has been instrumental 
in changing contraceptive behavior, even as it also evokes 
controversy. Together, pronatalism and family planning 
generate a complicated population discourse that affects the 
delivery of reproductive healthcare. 
This discourse links population strength with cultural 
3.  There is one Member of Parliament (MP) seat for Ladakhis in the 
central government. In the J&K state government, there are four Member of 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) seats—two for Kargil and two for Leh.
4. See Leh district and Kargil district websites (  and http://kargil.
nic.in/).
5. Dundup is a pseudonym, as are all other names in this piece.
6. Pronatalist activism emerged in the 1930s among the Buddhist 
pandit community in Srinagar.  See van Beek (2004) for more details on the 
Kashmir Raj Bodhi Maha Sabha.
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strength, such as the Buddhist doctor who explained, “to 
preserve our Ladakhi culture, our population should be 
higher. We should have more population.” While some worry 
about population growth, others worry about population 
composition, specifically that of Muslims and Buddhists. 
Although they have similar population numbers and growth 
rates (see Tables 1 and 2), it is common for each group to 
state that they are in the minority (Bray, 1991; Gutschow, 
2006).7 These kinds of claims made by Ladakhis reflect 
India’s national reservation policy, a form of affirmative 
action intended for historically disadvantaged groups, which 
follows caste groupings and tribal affiliations (i.e. Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribe status). Since population worries 
and declarations of minority status rely upon numbers, 
practices of counting have become more politicized. 
There is little consensus on Ladakh’s population 
numbers, trends, and composition. Population data is 
limited and unreliable, as there are inconsistencies between 
data from the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) state, the 
national census, Ladakh’s health department, NGOs, and 
independent research groups. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, 
Ladakh’s population is small (290,492) compared to other 
regions of India, though it has been steadily growing since 
the 1970s, even as the growth rate has been declining since 
2001 (Guilmoto & Rajan, 2002; Jina, 1996, Government of 
India, 2001, 2011).8 
What is striking in the following tables is the shift in 
population composition that occurred between 2001 and 
2011, which is calculated at the district level rather than by 
specific religious group. While it might appear that in ten 
years (2001-2011) the region moved from a Muslim majority 
to a Buddhist majority, Muslims still remain the majority 
by a small margin, even though the Buddhist population is 
currently growing faster. In 2001, the census showed that 
the population of Buddhist-majority Leh district had fallen 
behind that of Kargil district. Yet, by 2011, Leh district had 
surpassed Kargil, likely due to efforts to encourage Buddhist 
reproduction. 
Interpreting these population composition shifts is not 
an easy task, especially when both groups make minority 
claims. Furthermore, while migration levels into the region 
(i.e., Kashmiris, Nepalis) have steadily increased over recent 
decades, migration is also susceptible to mistakes, such as 
double counting, as well as the “politics of counting.”9 The 
recent population growth rate in Leh district suggests that 
Buddhist pronatalism and anti-family planning activism are 
succeeding in changing fertility practices. 
the politiCS oF Fertility/AengSt
8. Also see http://www.nfhsindia.org/ and http://www.measuredhs.
com/.
9. The 2011 census initially reported Ladakh as having the highest 
child sex ratio in India, which was due to counting the military.    
10. Due to civil unrest, there is no census data for Kargil district for 
the 1991 census.
7. The remaining minority of Ladakh’s population is comprised of 
Christians, Sikhs, and Hindu families (Government of India, 2001, 2011).
Table 1: Population by district
Total Population Kargil district (Muslim-majority) Leh district (Buddhist-majority)
1981 census 65,992 68,380
1991 census 10 N/A 89,474
2001 census 119,307 117,232
2011 census 143,388 147,104
(Government of India, 2001 Leh and Kargil government websites (http://leh.nic.in/ and http://kargil.nic.in/) 
Table 2: Population growth rate by district
Population Growth Rate Kargil district (Muslim-majority) Leh district (Buddhist-majority)
1991-2001 33.55 30.15
2001-2011 20.18 25.48
(Government of India, 2001, 2011)
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“Demographic depiction” is the term Geoff Childs uses 
to describe the deployment of population statistics and 
representations in such a way that it will “ justify a current 
power structure or rationalize a state’s intervention in the 
intimate realm of reproduction” (Childs, 2008: 211). This 
occurs not only through the use of statistics to convey 
scientific “truths” but also through the use of particular 
language that adds subjective meanings onto numbers (such 
as adjectives like “extreme” and “excessive” to describe 
population trends). Demographic depiction illustrates how 
power and knowledge work together, where institutions 
of power, such as the state, can easily produce subjective 
portrayals of the population, which are taken to be objective 
(Childs, 2008; Foucault, 1997). Demographic depictions are 
powerful because numbers can cause strong reverberations 
throughout communities, as “demographic perceptions 
about communities can lead to exactly the kind of political 
and social instability that demographic events themselves 
can” (Basu, 1996: 154). There are multiple explanations 
for the changes in Ladakh’s population over the past few 
decades, yet a general sense of worry about Ladakh’s 
population future persists.11 Group struggles—specifically, 
the relationship between the majority and minority—are 
articulated in cultural terms, where struggles result in 
demographic tensions and occasionally violence. 
Population discourses in Ladakh—both that of Buddhists 
and Muslims—fluctuate between expressions of competitive 
demography and a sense of Ladakhi exceptionalism. 
Competitive demography emerges from the pervasive feeling 
of marginalization among Buddhists, who worry about their 
population decline and are convinced that Muslims are “out-
breeding” them. From their perspective, the diminishing 
number of Buddhists indicates both the weakened state of 
Buddhism and the likelihood of Muslim dominance in the 
region. These population worries reinforce pervasive feelings 
of political marginalization that are felt acutely in villages, 
where rural to urban migration and the preference for secular 
education are causing notable changes. For example, a lama 
from Zangskar explained the rationale for more children, as 
he linked population numbers with power in the community.
We need more births…we need to be more 
influential…I told the villagers that we should 
have more children: 6 per family at least. No 
problem, we have a school, we have a gonpa, 
we have a nunnery. We can take more people, 
there’s no problem, I told them. More people 
is more power. 500 people, 500 power. 1,000 
people, 1,000 power. Then only we will be 
heard.
11. These include the following: changing fertility practices 
(decreasing polyandry, family    planning and contraceptive use); changing 
household structure (rural to urban migration); improvements in medical 
care (increased life expectancy and decreased infant and maternal 
mortality), and the decreasing strength of the monastic system.
In addition to fears of a weakened Buddhism and weak 
Buddhist political base, the competitive demography 
discourse also characterizes growing Muslim fertility as a 
threat. A growing number of Buddhists have blamed family 
planning use for the decline of the Buddhist population. 
They also explain the growth of the Muslim population as 
due to Muslim women’s reluctance to use birth control. For 
example, as a member of the Buddhist women’s group Ama 
Tsogspa explained, “Muslim women didn’t do ligation or 
spacing so their population is increasing and we (Buddhist 
women) did ligation and spacing and so now our population 
is decreasing.” Religion gets taken up in the competitive 
demography discourse, where the presumed high fertility 
of Muslims is associated with Islam, whereas Buddhists 
point to their religious practices (the lama system and 
historical polyandry) to explain their low fertility. Yet, these 
characterizations of distinct Muslim and Buddhist positions 
on fertility control overlook women’s actual support for 
family planning, as well as the complexities of reproductive 
decision-making in such a politicized context.
Though they have different explanations for population 
change, Muslims and Buddhists express their distinct 
experiences of regional marginality, which is articulated as 
“Ladakhi exceptionalism.” This view argues that Ladakh’s 
low population and low fertility distinguishes it from the 
rest of India (Guilmoto & Rajan, 2002; Gutschow, 2006). 
Because Ladakh’s culture is characterized as under threat—
from a range of “outside” influences including modernity 
and the impact of foreigners—some community members 
argue that Ladakh’s low population warrants its exclusion 
from the national population policy. In November 2007, the 
Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) requested the Jammu 
and Kashmir state government to stop promoting family 
planning in Ladakh, with the ex-president of LBA writing, 
“The Ladakhi race has limited population in the country 
and there is apprehension of its extinction. Hence, you are 
requested not to apply small family norms in the district as 
a special case” (Ul-Hassan, 2007). Similarly, the LBA has 
also sent letters to SNM hospital that demand the stop of 
tubal ligations and abortions (Smith, 2009a, 2009b). While 
Ladakhi exceptionalism is most evident among Buddhists, 
the sentiment that Ladakh is different from the rest of 
India and has unique needs is also shared by Muslims. 
Whatever shape the population discourse takes in Ladakh—
competitive demography or Ladakhi exceptionalism—the 
population continues to be perceived as a problem that has 
both political and reproductive ramifications.
“HYPER-FERTILE” MUSLIMS AND 
“VULNERABLE” BUDDHISTS 
Population discourses produce two kinds of reproductive 
subjects: the “hyper-fertile Muslim woman” and the 
“vulnerable Buddhist.” The construction of the “hyper-fertile 
Muslim woman” relies on the idea that Muslim women are 
linked closely with tradition, and that tradition means high 
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fertility. This perception of high Muslim fertility is deeply 
entrenched and pervasive in India, particularly evident in 
reports contrasting Muslim and Hindu fertility in demography 
and development (Basu, 1996). The “vulnerable Buddhist” 
subject is created through discourse that characterizes 
Buddhism as weakening, often due to “outside” forces such 
as modernity, tourism, and development (Crossette, 1996). 
Like the “hyper-fertile Muslim,” the “vulnerable Buddhist” 
subject relies upon broader regional debates within Asia, 
where Buddhism is perceived as being “under threat.” These 
two reproductive subjects are a powerful reminder of how 
population is becoming a matter of social concern in Ladakh, 
while also reflecting broader debates going on in South Asia 
about modernity, development, and communalism. 
Reproductive subjects have been at the receiving end 
of a wide range of policies aimed at controlling fertility 
and managing reproduction. The social body is controlled 
through “technologies of sex,” where individual bodies are 
disciplined and the population is managed simultaneously 
(Foucault, 1978). These technologies rely upon knowledge of 
sexuality, population, and health, as well as the convergence 
of political and economic interests on sexuality (morality 
campaigns, ideologies of sexual responsibility, control of 
reproductive choices). Women who willingly control their 
fertility in compliance with state-sponsored population 
control programs become sexually responsible subjects, 
in that they enact the self-regulation of their sex life. India 
has numerous incentive programs that encourage women to 
discipline themselves. In Ladakh, women are paid by the 
state if they deliver their child in a hospital, get an IUD/IUCD 
inserted, or become sterilized. Practices that make one legible 
to the state—i.e., adopting family planning or having an 
institutional delivery—not only render one legitimate in the 
eyes of the state but also have social and gendered meanings, 
such as when particular practices are characterized as 
“modern” or “backwards” (Kanaaneh, 2002). Certain sexual 
practices—such as polyandry and arranged marriages—
are associated with tradition and viewed as “backwards,” 
whereas “modern” sexual subjects are educated on sexual 
risk and family planning (Abu Lughod, 2005).
Muslim women in Ladakh are presumed to be more 
strongly linked to “tradition” than Buddhist women, which 
leads to further assumptions that they would be opposed to 
family planning. Yet, this is not reflected in my data, which 
shows that Muslim women not only support family planning 
(as an idea), but also are having far fewer children than is 
typically assumed (see Table 3, 4, 5).12 Though Buddhist 
women still had a lower average number of children, the 
difference is not nearly as significant as the discourse would 
suggest. 
The average number of children is lowest in urban Leh 
and Kargil and highest in rural Diskit, where contraceptive 
methods are rarely available. This reflects not only the 
importance of having children in rural areas but may also 
reflect the increasing influence of pronatalism on Buddhist 
women’s fertility. Yet, similar to what Geoff Childs found 
in his research with Tibetan women in exile, fertility can 
remain low even in the presence of a strong pronatalist 
ideology (Childs, 2008). While Ladakhi Buddhists may 
publically support pronatalist ideology, they still have low 
fertility (1.98), which is lower that the total fertility rate (TFR) 
of Jammu and Kashmir state (3.0) and the nation (3.2).13 
Though contraception is available, it is primarily 
accessible to those in urban areas, since rural health posts 
do not reliably stock contraceptives. Of the five methods 
available,14 IUDs are the most common method across 
12. My fertility data is based on conducting 237 hospital-based 
interviews with Buddhist and Muslim women in three locations (Leh, 
Kargil, and Diskit). My data reports on the average number of children 
women are having (CEB, children ever born), not the total fertility rate 
(TFR), which is calculated differently. The TFR reflects the average number 
of children that would be born to a women during her reproductive 
lifetime, calculated by averaging the average number of children for women 
of each year of reproductive age. The low number of children ever born 
(CEB) in Ladakh is due to fertility choices, rather than infant mortality, 
which is fairly low for the region.
13. See Guilmoto and Rajan, 2002. The 2005-2006 National Family 
Health Survey, conducted by the Jammu and Kashmir state, reports a 
different TFR for the Jammu and Kashmir state (2.4) and the Indian state 
(2.7). Though calculating TFR differs from calculating the average number 
of children, it is evident that Ladakhi fertility is low in comparison to the 
state and region. Working from a small sample size, Sara Smith reports a 
higher number of children for women in Leh district, with a mean number 
of children for Buddhists (3.18); Sunnis (2.44); and Shi’as (3.25).
14. IUD/IUCD (intrauterine device); male and female sterilization 
(tubectomies, laparoscopic ligation, and male vasectomy); condoms, birth 
control pills, and injectable hormones (Depo-Provera).
Table 3: Average number of children ever born (CEB) by region and religion
Location Average # of children:  
Muslim women
Average # of children:  
Buddhist women
Both Buddhist & Muslim 
women
Leh 1.83 1.66 1.69
Kargil 2.27 2.0 2.23
Diskit 2.85 2.27 2.47
Average of three regions 2.34 1.98 2.11
the politiCS oF Fertility/AengSt
28 HIMALAYA  XXXII (1-2) 2012
Ladakh, as they do not require additional resupply or regular 
check-ups, appealing to rural women who have travel far 
distances to health centers. Along with IUDs, sterilization 
(ligation) is another popular method of contraception. That 
permanent and long-acting contraceptive methods are most 
used in Ladakh is not surprising, given the government 
incentive schemes that encourage their use.15 My research 
shows contraceptive use to be high among Ladakhi women, 
evidenced by the number of women who reported using (or 
having used) contraceptives, along with statements from 
interviews about desires to space their family (see Table 
4). Among women interviewed at the three hospitals (Leh, 
Kargil, Diskit), the average percentage of contraceptive use 
is 75 percent. Regionally, contraceptive use was highest 
in Leh (80 percent), followed by Diskit (75 percent) and 
then Kargil (62 percent). While the average contraceptive 
use of Buddhist women is higher (80 percent) than that of 
Muslim women (65 percent), the rate of Muslim women’s 
contraceptive use is still higher than India’s national average 
(56 percent) or that of the Jammu and Kashmir state (53 
percent). What is also notable is that Leh is the only location 
where Muslim contraceptive use (89 percent) is higher than 
that of Buddhists (78 percent), which suggests the influence 
of the pronatalist movement on Buddhist women’s fertility.16 
What emerges from my hospital survey is the following: 
Muslim fertility is not as high as perceived; contraceptive 
use is extensive throughout Ladakh; and disparities between 
Buddhist and Muslim reproductive behaviors are not as 
dramatic as perceived.
The perception of high Muslim fertility and Buddhist 
vulnerability is not simply due to feeling marginal in relation 
to the Indian state. This perception also reflects internal 
political tensions within Ladakh, where religious unity and 
population strength are considered necessary for securing 
political power (van Beek, 2004). Given this complicated 
15. Government incentive schemes encourage use of particular 
contraceptive methods—paying women 10 rupees to get an IUD inserted 
and 600 rupees to get ligation surgery performed.
16. It is important to note that my data is taken from interviews 
conducted with women at the hospital, which likely reflects a higher 
contraceptive use than those women from far villages who are less likely to 
travel to the hospital.
political context, religious and “cultural” groups such 
as the LBA can mobilize and unify Buddhists, even as it 
conceals divisions that erupt within their own community. 
The pronatalist movement reflects this sense of Buddhist 
vulnerability and re-emerged in recent years in response to 
the politicized debates about Ladakh’s population. Members 
of Buddhist community groups and religious leaders have 
actively promoted pronatalism and advocated against family 
planning through conducting village visits.  During these 
visits, Buddhist women are told about the population threat, 
that family planning is a sin, and encouraged to produce 
more Buddhist children. According to a 31-year-old Buddhist 
mother in Nubra, the LBA began organizing village visits 
there in 2005, and there have been annual meetings there 
ever since:
First, LBA comes to Diskit, then they say don’t 
do ligation because all our population is going 
down and the Muslim population is going up. 
Then one day the Muslim population will be 
higher than us. Then all the women are scared, 
thinking what will happen with our children?
Women in Nubra acknowledged a heightened sense of 
worry about the population, although their worries were 
highest immediately after village visits, with their worries 
dissipating over time. Village visits cause women to have 
conflicted feelings about using contraception. For example, 
a 39-year-old Buddhist woman with two children noted that 
she had never regretted having ligation surgery, yet began to 
feel regretful during pronatalist village visits. A 50-year-old 
Buddhist mother of three from Panamik village told me that 
she doesn’t regret her ligation, but now tells her daughter 
to give birth to more children than she had. Some women 
questioned the pronatalist discourse, noting that it was 
difficult for poor women to take care of many children and 
that having many children was difficult for women’s health, 
two issues often overlooked in village visits. On April 17, 
2008, an anonymous letter was posted throughout Leh’s 
Main Bazaar, which described apocalyptic warnings about 
what would happen to Ladakh’s Buddhist population. Titled 
“Where has Ladakh been taken?”, the text includes the 
Table 4: Contraceptive use by region and religion
Location Contraceptive use: 
Muslim women
Contraceptive use:  
Buddhist women
Both Buddhist and   
Muslim women
Leh 89% 78% 80%
Kargil 59% 83% 62%
Diskit 59% 83% 75%
Average of three regions 65% 80% 75%
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following:
Evil eye has struck. Leaders are paralyzed. 
Temples are locked. Buddhists are at a loss. 
Unity has been destroyed...Friends have become 
enemies and our country has filled with shit. 
Leh city is filling up with bad smells. Ladakh 
has become a place of fighting. Our leaders’ 
unity has been broken. Buddhists’ backbone 
has broken. The legs of development have been 
broken…The Buddhists are divided…All the 
Buddhists have lost their shame. There are bars 
opening everywhere. The Lineage has become 
useless. All girls have become nuns. Brothers 
have married the same wife. Countless birth 
doors have been closed. Buddhists are going to 
be finished [emphasis mine]. We’re at the end 
of time. Glaciers have melted away. Untimely 
floods have come. Grasshoppers have eaten half 
the country. Lamas and monks are mixed in all 
kinds of things. The knife is at our throat and 
we are blaming each other for murder. Religion 
has been harmed. Hey Buddhists, think about 
it. Still you have time to think. One day you’ll 
have to leave this place. One day you will have 
to convert to another religion.
This letter exemplifies the worry of a weakened Buddhism—
by internal conflict, lack of unity, and weak morals. This is 
linked to concerns that the Buddhist population is dying 
out, indeed, “countless birth doors have been closed” and 
“Buddhists are going to be finished.” Though Muslims are not 
explicitly addressed in this letter, it is evident that conversion 
fears and fertility are linked to cultural survival. Muslim 
reaction to Buddhist pronatalism is a general reluctance to 
speak about the issue or feigned ignorance. While some 
Muslims are sympathetic to Buddhist population worries, they 
are not in agreement with the communal undertone of the 
pronatalist movement. As a Muslim leader in Leh explained, 
“I have sympathy for the LBA position because Ladakh was a 
Buddhist country. They are just worried about demographics 
changing, so Buddhists are naturally very worried. But they 
should not communalize the issue.” The reluctance of Muslims 
to react directly and strongly to Buddhist pronatalism is 
likely due to worries that the population issue could escalate 
already existing tensions between the two groups. 
FAMILY PLANNING: SINFUL YET SUPPORTED
Opposition to family planning in Ladakh is expressed 
in both religious and political terms. Political opposition 
is articulated as an issue of representation, where having a 
lower population means less power and visibility within the 
state. While religious opposition from Buddhist and Muslim 
leaders portrays family planning as sinful, there are distinct 
differences between the two religious communities. Buddhists 
point to the authority of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who 
himself has made statements about population, where he 
both supports family planning and advocates increasing the 
Tibetan Buddhist population (Childs, 2008; French, 2003). 
The difficulty of reconciling Buddhist principles of non-
violence with the global issue of overpopulation is evident in 
the following statement from His Holiness:
From a Buddhist viewpoint, every human 
being is precious and one should avoid family 
planning and birth control. But then if we look 
from the global level, that precious human life 
is now overcrowding the world. As a result 
not only is it a question of survival of a single 
human being but that of the entire humanity. 
Therefore the conclusion is that family planning 
is necessary provided it is based on non-violent 
principles (Childs, 2008: 169).
Although His Holiness the Dalai Lama is revered and 
admired by both Ladakhi Buddhists and Muslims, many of 
his comments (“every life is precious”) have at times been 
utilized to justify Ladakhi pronatalism. Furthermore, many 
Ladakhis have noted that there is a discrepancy between what 
the Dalai Lama says in English and his speeches in Tibetan, 
where he refers more explicitly to the vulnerability of the 
Tibetan population and encourages pronatalism. Prominent 
Ladakhi Rinpoches have spoken publicly on pronatalism 
and contraception, and have made statements that link 
contraception to murder (Smith, 2009a, 2009b).
Because many Buddhists equate contraception and 
abortion, preventing conception is viewed as a sin (Childs, 
2008). The Ladakhi terms for contraception—skye gog/skyes 
go thabs (birth control methods); thugu mi skecesi thaps 
(methods to not have children); and skezgo kak (to block the 
birth canal)—are understood locally as both “birth control” 
and “closing the birth canal/birth door” (Norman, 2010). 
Thus, the use of contraception blocks the birth door and 
prevents the rebirth of another Buddhist. Ladakhi Buddhist 
opposition to family planning is more than just recognizing 
that life is precious—the use of family planning is specifically 
singled out as a sin. While the LBA has been most active 
in opposing permanent methods of contraception, many 
members are also against temporary methods as well. An ex-
president of the LBA explained:
When the small family norm was introduced 
in India, the medical people actively enforced 
it…but now the attitudes are changing. Now 
health facilities have improved so we shouldn’t 
bother with family planning at all. Monks talk 
of both permanent and temporary methods of 
family planning as being wrong from a religious 
point of view. When you are reborn, the soul 
is roaming around somewhere when you stop 
the politiCS oF Fertility/AengSt
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and disrupt the soul with something like family 
planning.
From a Buddhist perspective, family planning interrupts 
Bardo—the liminal time between death and rebirth—
when souls are reborn (Nyima Rinpoche, 1991). Ligation is 
perceived as especially sinful because it permanently “closes 
the door” (rgo cukces/rdumces/ban cukces) to a new life. 
Temporary methods are more accepted, since women can 
have more children later. Most opposition to family planning 
is directed at permanent procedures—such as ligation and 
abortion—which are stigmatized, even though both remain 
legal and available.17 Beginning in 2005-06, stickers detailing 
proper moral and reproductive behavior began appearing 
throughout Leh, primarily pasted onto buses, store windows, 
and even within Leh’s SNM hospital. Produced by the LBA, 
the text of the stickers stated:
The four facts:
1. Abortion is a cause to sever oneself from human 
rebirth in the next lives.
2. Marriage between close kins is non-virtuous sexual 
misconduct.
3. It is an act of partiality if the inheritance is not 
equally distributed among brothers and sisters.
4. Disloyal it is, not to have affinity to ones own ethnic 
cultural values.
In naming these four premises as “facts,” these stickers link 
proper moral behavior with cultural and ethnic obligations. 
The “fact” about abortion is that it will continue to negatively 
affect women—not just in this lifetime, but also in their 
subsequent lives. Thus, abortion and ligation are not only sins 
in this lifetime, but will have clear karmic effects into one’s 
next life. Some felt that the use of temporary methods—such 
as an IUD—could affect the level into which one was reborn. 
As a mother from Diskit explained:
I wouldn’t get ligation because it’s a very big 
sin. Suppose I die with ligation and then I [am] 
never born again as a person. Some people say 
this. If menopause comes, I should remove the 
IUCD because it is so dikpa [sinful]. If you die 
with the IUCD it is so dikpa. Elder people say 
this. You should throw it away. [If you die with 
the IUD still inserted] also you will not be born 
as a human being in the next life.
Every birth that is prevented through contraception deprives 
someone else of a human rebirth. Furthermore, one’s sins 
17. Though abortion is a sin, there are circumstances where it may 
be permitted. “Buddhists are more willing to condemn abortion on moral 
grounds than to oppose legislation of it, often being more permissive in 
practice than in outlook” (Harvey, 2000: 350). See Harvey, 2000 for a 
further discussion on Buddhist ethics.
come with you during the process of rebirth. This means 
that when a woman uses family planning in this life, it will 
affect her subsequent level of rebirth, as she will likely be 
reborn in a lower kingdom (rung).18 
Though there are no karmic consequences in Islam, 
there are religious explanations for why family planning is 
opposed. Having a child is viewed as a gift of God, and to 
prevent that gift (through contraception) is sinful. Permanent 
methods, such as abortion and sterilization, are haram and 
considered sinful because they cannot be reversed (Mahdavi, 
2008; Tober et al, 2006). Engaging in practices considered 
haram—such as sterilization—has real life effects on both 
women and men. For example, in her writing about family 
planning in Kashmir, Sangeeta Chattoo describes the social 
ostracization of Kashmiri men who have had vasectomies, 
where they are not allowed to enter mosques, which in effect 
changes their relationship to God (Chattoo, 1990). Yet, there 
is nothing specifically in the Qur’an that argues against 
contraception, and religious perspectives on contraceptives 
differ greatly across the Muslim world (Hoodfar, 1995; 
Mahdavi, 2008). According to Islamic law, the fetus is not 
considered to have a soul until 120 days (17 weeks), which 
is why it is often permissible to have an abortion in the first 
trimester (Mahdavi, 2008; Tober et al, 2006). That abortion 
is both permitted and considered a sin indicates the space 
within local interpretations of Islam that tolerates birth 
control. 
In contrast to Buddhist leadership in Ladakh, Muslim 
religious leaders and community organizations have not 
taken a specific stance against family planning, though some 
religious leaders are strongly opposed to it. One Muslim 
leader in Leh explained, “If a Muslim woman is sick, then 
family planning is allowed. You have not violated Islamic 
Shari’a. Abortion is a sin because of killing. Ligation is 
allowed. The Muslim community has never made a position 
covertly or overtly about family planning.” Though Muslim 
leaders may be personally opposed to family planning, they 
have not engaged in political activism against it. As the Indian 
demographer Alaka Basu has noted, Islamic opposition to 
family planning is often more about politics than religion 
(Basu, 1996).
Islamic opposition to family planning is contextual, 
with exceptions often made for women’s health and other 
social conditions. Sameena, an unmarried Muslim girl in 
Hundar village, described the complexities surrounding 
family planning in Islam, as it is commonly viewed as a sin 
in Ladakh but there are also allowances made for it. “Ligation 
is a sin. A child is God’s wish. How much children we have is 
God’s wish. We cannot go against God’s wishes,” she stated, 
18. While one’s level of rebirth may be affected by family planning, 
Smith noted that family planning cannot produce certain birth outcomes. 
“According to Buddhist women I interviewed, Rinpoches argue that each 
child comes with its own sode, or luck, (in this context, it could also be 
interpreted as karmic burdens) and thus attempts to produce certain 
outcomes through family planning are futile” (Smith, 2009a: 147).
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“but family planning is allowed in certain circumstances—
for the very poor, like if they cannot look after the child, or a 
situation where the women’s health is in danger or if there is 
a rape.” Even with these accommodations, Muslim women’s 
reproductive decision making is still constrained by religious 
opposition, which is much more notable among Shi’a women 
(Grist, 2008; Smith, 2009a, 2009b). Yet, like Buddhist 
women, Muslim women stated that family planning was a 
sin, yet used contraception and were grateful to be able to 
space their families.
Like Muslim and Buddhist women, religious and political 
leaders appeared to contradict their public opposition to 
family planning. Gynecologists frequently pointed out to 
me that the men most vocal in their opposition to family 
planning all had fewer than two children. Speaking about 
religious leaders, one gynecologist in Kargil noted, “They 
always say that family planning is a sin (gunaah; gunha). But 
they are sending their wives to the doctors, saying ‘please do 
this’ [referring to ligation] but then are lecturing to others 
[in the community] not to [get sterilized]. Some say both 
[ligation and IUDs] are a sin, some say only ligation…as for 
my opinion, it is not a sin in Islam. Islam doesn’t say you 
don’t go for family planning. It’s an interpretation of religion.” 
Interviews with hundreds of Ladakhis show that support 
for family planning is widespread despite the prevalent 
discourse that constitutes it as a sin.19
Both Muslim and Buddhist women support family 
planning, even as they describe it as a sin and make 
distinctions between permanent and temporary methods 
(see Table 5). Sterilized women characterized ligation as a 
sin, yet would add that they had no regrets about choosing 
a permanent method of contraception. Some women were 
scolded by family members or were made to feel guilty 
about their ligation by religious and community members. 
A 47-year-old Buddhist woman from Chilling with three 
children who had a ligation ten years ago explained:
19. This is based on interviews conducted in Leh, Kargil, Sankoo, 
Diskit, Chushot, Chamshen, Panamik, and Hundar. Interviews were with 
Buddhists, Muslims (Sunnis, Shi‘as, NurbakShi‘as) and among a wide 
variety of groupings (married and unmarried; women and men; doctors and 
medical staff; and religious and political leaders)
Some people say it’s not good, but for my 
opinion I feel it’s good…Otherwise we have so 
many children who we cannot clothe and feed, 
and I think that it also a sin! Other ladies who 
already had ligation nobody said anything to 
them…in those days, it was easily acceptable, 
nowadays, more people are saying negative 
things about it.
According to my data from hospital survey, when 
specifically asked about “family planning,” 52 percent of 
women unequivocally support family planning, 17 percent 
support family planning conditionally—after having 
“enough” children or through distinguishing temporary 
and permanent methods (“ligation is a sin but spacing is 
good”). While 13 percent were unsure, only 9 percent were 
directly opposed to family planning. Those opposed typically 
mentioned the influence of community groups that were 
active in pronatalism. Seven percent stated that their support 
depended on external factors—such as the health of the 
mother, the importance of education, and family/household 
security.
This data suggests that total opposition to family 
planning in Ladakh is low; that Buddhist women are more 
conflicted about family planning than Muslim women; and 
that Muslim women are more supportive of family planning 
than is often assumed. This runs counter to the strongly held 
perception that Muslim women are reluctant to use family 
planning. While most women support family planning, 
women tend to join the public discourse about population 
worries, rather than take a stance on access to contraception 
and family planning.  
Children’s education and the increasing costs of raising 
children were the most commonly stated reasons women gave 
for family planning use. Fertility decisions were linked to 
education. As others have noted, changing fertility practices 
are often due to a shift in attitude among parents, who begin 
to prefer “quality” children to quantity (Greenhalgh, 2005; 
Smith, 2009a, 2009b). In Ladakh, pursuing an education 
invariably means that children will leave their village 
and move to urban sites—such as Leh, Kargil, or outside 
Ladakh—to pursue additional education. While their pursuit 
Table 5: Family planning support by religion
Opinion on family planning? All women Buddhist women Muslim women
Unequivocal support 52% 49% 58%
Conditional support 17% 15% 21%
Unsure 13% 17% 6%
Opposed 9% 9% 9%
Support depended on external factors 7% 8% 4%
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of education may open up new employment opportunities, it 
also disproportionately places a higher agricultural burden 
on parents and grandparents, who remain in the village (Hay, 
1997). Given urban migration and employment transfers, 
the decision to limit one’s fertility has become entangled in 
wider worries about the strength of Ladakhi culture.
Fertility decision-making presents a paradox, where 
having fewer children means less familial security. In a 
context where children are expected to take care of aging 
parents, the fear of being alone as one ages is salient. Thus, 
some parents decide to have more children because they feel 
insecure about the survival of their children. A Sunni father 
in Kargil district described how child survival and religious 
norms took precedence over his desire to have a small family.
The Muslim population is increasing because 
people don’t plan families, now we have more 
money so (it is) easier to have more children…
my wife had 7 children, 4 died, 3 survived. 
I only wanted one boy and one girl…so we 
Islamically plan our family but the Indian 
government forces us to plan our family. If an 
epidemic comes, then what to do?
By “Islamically planning their family,” the Sunni father 
saw his wife’s fertility as within God’s hands. This couple 
did not use “modern” methods of contraception because it 
went against their religious beliefs, instead viewing each 
pregnancy as according to God’s wishes. Though it would 
appear that concerns about child survival would dissipate 
with improvements in reproductive healthcare, many 
still worried that a ligated woman could lose her existing 
children due to diseases or accidents, which would leave 
her childless. Together, the concerns about family security, 
changing household composition, and migration underscore 
the larger anxieties about population.
THE POLITICIZATION OF REPRODUCTION
“Where else in the world is there an abortion day or a 
sterilization day declared at the hospital?” a Buddhist doctor 
asked me during an interview. He was referring to the 
earlier era of family planning in Ladakh (1980s-90s), when 
certain days of the week were set aside at the hospital for 
sterilization surgeries, which came to be known as “ligation 
day.” The recent elimination of “ligation day” at the hospital 
indicates how the politicization of reproduction is impacting 
the medical sphere.
Together pronatalism and activism against family 
planning have affected the delivery of reproductive healthcare. 
Buddhists worried about the population, many of whom are 
from the LBA, are associated with a number of politicized 
incidents, such as interference with ligation clinics and 
anonymous threats against those who work in reproductive 
health (Gutschow, 2011). Doctors at Leh’s SNM hospital 
describe a staff that is often uncooperative, particularly when 
it comes to abortion or ligation surgeries, which go against 
their religious beliefs. Stories abound of hospital staff that 
refuse to assist gynecologists with controversial surgeries, 
such as ligation and abortion. It has also been rumored 
that medical equipment, such as the laparoscope, has been 
deliberately vandalized. One gynecologist explained the 
constraints she was under:
There are major problems with the staff, 
particularly with abortion, the nurses are 
uncooperative…they say that when surgeries 
are listed on OT [operating theater] list, it’s 
too public. Thus, staff say to me to perform 
abortions and ligations in the delivery room, 
which is more discrete but then the labor room 
staff complain, saying ‘why should it happen 
here?’
Activism against family planning has targeted Ladakh’s few 
gynecologists. One described how a male from the Youth 
Wing (an ancillary group within Ladakh’s largest cultural 
association, the Ladakh Buddhist Association) told her that 
she would have to personally explain to His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama why the Buddhist population is decreasing. These 
types of statements not only overlook Ladakhi women’s own 
agency in choosing to plan their families but also presume 
that the Buddhist population is in decline, even though 
there is little numerical data to support this. “If you don’t 
want family planning, then don’t use it,” one gynecologist 
said, a bit exasperated, “but don’t interrupt my work.” After 
describing the politicized and tense hospital environment, 
one doctor said, “I just want cooperation in the hospital.”
While gynecologists overwhelmingly support family 
planning and contraceptive access, most doctors stated their 
preference for temporary spacing methods and a desire to 
avoid ligation. A male doctor with three children explained, 
“I prefer other methods of birth control besides ligation. 
(Ligation is) only for those with four or five children, but not 
for those with two or three children.” Opposition to ligation 
was evident among male doctors, such as the Buddhist 
doctor who said, “Ligation should be stopped for at least 
10-15 years. Spacing should be there but ligation is not 
necessary. Ligation and NSV (nonsurgical vasectomy) should 
be stopped entirely.” 
In addition to impacting the work of gynecologists, 
hospital politics surrounding contraception impacts 
women’s access to reproductive healthcare. Most notable 
is the significant decline in ligations, which decreased 97 
percent between January 2004 and January 2009 (see Table 
6). While the average monthly ligation rate at SNM hospital 
during 2004-2005 was 41, it had declined to an average of 
two surgeries a month by 2008-2009. The rapid decline in 
ligation shows the influence of the activism against family 
planning. Furthermore, it has also influenced attitudes 
towards temporary methods, with a number of village 
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women telling me in interviews that ligation and IUDs had 
become illegal, even though they remain legal and available. 
As reproduction has become more politicized in the hospital 
setting, it not only impacts the reproductive choices of 
Ladakhi women but also creates a culture of surveillance 
among the medical staff within the hospital.
CONCLUSION
Population discourses and fertility behavior appear 
contradictory in Ladakh. How to explain pronatalist 
activists who themselves plan their families? Or the different 
perceptions Muslims and Buddhists have about each other’s 
population while also sharing similar population anxieties? 
Two population discourses—competitive demography 
and Ladakhi exceptionalism—unproblematically coexist 
in Ladakh, which creates particular kinds of reproductive 
subjects (the “hyper-fertile Muslim” and the “vulnerable 
Buddhist”). These discourses also have material effects—
generating pronatalism and intensifying hospital politics—
which impact gynecologists, shape women’s reproductive 
decision-making, and limit access to care.
Furthermore, these discourses are shaping relations 
between and among Buddhists and Muslims, at times 
unifying them in a shared Ladakhi identity (via the “Ladakhi 
exceptionalism” discourse), at times polarizing them along 
religious and regional grounds. On one hand, the population 
issue unifies Ladakhis in moments when they feel threatened 
and marginalized within the Jammu and Kashmir state 
and the nation. The idea that Ladakh’s cultural strength 
must be preserved is something upon which all Ladakhis 
from all regions and religions agree. On the other hand, 
these discourses have polarized relations between Muslims 
and Buddhists. Characterizations of Buddhist and Muslim 
fertility—Buddhists as more vulnerable and Muslim women 
as hyper-fertile and unwilling to use family planning—are 
not only deeply entrenched, but also are called upon when 
communal tensions erupt.
The politicization of reproduction has put both women 
and gynecologists in difficult positions. While gynecologists 
are committed to reproductive education and access to 
contraception, many are also worried about Ladakh’s 
population. Similarly, though women were happy to space 
their family, they also felt it was a sin. “We should not do 
family planning on the religious side, according to Buddhism, 
I did a sin,” a 39-year-old Buddhist woman with two children 
explained, though she then smiled and added, “but for myself 
it is good.” This comment illustrates the division between 
idealized subjectivity (ideals of proper behavior according 
to religious affiliations, political pressure, and family 
obligations) and practice (where women use birth control). 
Ladakhi women are thus left in a difficult position—where 
their reproductive decisions are constrained by religion 
and politics, yet they express a desire to be able control the 
number of children they have.
the politiCS oF Fertility/AengSt
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